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ESSAY

Extraterritoriality and Human Rights After
Kiobel
BETH STEPHENS†

Are human rights extraterritorial? In this Essay, I address the
question from three different perspectives. In Part I, I step back to
consider the first principles of human rights law. Whatever our
disagreements about the implementation of human rights norms, they
are clearly absolute prohibitions, binding both within and without the
territory of any one state. The prohibition on genocide, for example,
is a prohibition on committing acts defined as genocide anywhere.
Extraterritoriality, however, is relevant to the enforcement of human
rights norms, to determine when a state has the right or the obligation
to impose sanctions on those who violate human rights outside the
territory of that state. The second and third sections of this Essay
address two aspects of the debate over the extraterritorial
enforcement of human rights. In Part II, I discuss efforts to hold
corporations liable for human rights violations. In Part III, I address
the narrow issue decided by the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.1—the application of the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS)2 to cases involving some degree of extraterritoriality because
of the location of the human rights violations, the citizenship of the
defendants, or the plaintiffs’ lack of connections to the United States.
I.
The modern concept of human rights is, by definition,
extraterritorial. Human rights today are not dependent on geography
or government, but are rights of all human beings. The consequences
of this broad generalization, of course, are hotly contested. But it is
important to start with this first principle: extraterritoriality is the
†

Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Camden.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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starting place for human rights norms in the twenty-first century.
A.
The concept of human rights traces back to the ancient religious
and natural law norms that regulated the conduct of individuals and
their treatment of others.3 William Blackstone recognized that history
as underlying all of international law, which he grounded in ―maxims
and customs . . . of higher antiquity than memory or history can
reach‖4 and interpreted through ―the law of nature and reason.‖5
Blackstone viewed this law as governing interactions among states
and their citizens, not just state-to-state relations, defining the law of
nations as regulating all intercourse between ―two or more
independent states and the individuals belonging to each.‖6
As positivism dominated legal theory in the nineteenth century,
scholars narrowed the scope of international law to address state-tostate relations. Norms governing private interactions were
categorized as private international law. According to the positivist
view, only agreements accepted by states could create binding
international law norms. Individuals were relegated to a dependent
status: to the extent that individuals had any rights under international
law, those rights were by-products of the rights of states. Thus,
foreign citizens might be entitled to some protection because
violations of their rights were considered violations of the rights of
their states of citizenship. The rights of religious minorities were
protected as an extension of the rights of the states in which they
constituted a majority. As summarized by Oppenheim, ―the Law of
Nations is primarily a law between States,‖ and, as a result, states are
―the only subjects of the Law of Nations.‖7
Within this positivist framework, human rights law developed
through agreements among states. In the late nineteenth century,
states signed treaties in which they agreed to prohibit and punish
conduct such as the slave trade8 or the mistreatment of injured and
3. See MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 18–60 (2004).
4. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *67.
5. 4 id. at *67.
6. Id. at *66.
7. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 636 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955).
8. For a discussion of the gradual development of international rules barring slavery and
the slave trade, see Roger S. Clark, Steven Spielberg’s Amistad and Other Things I Have
Thought About in the Past Forty Years: International (Criminal) Law, Conflict of Laws,
Insurance and Slavery, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 371, 393–410 (1999).
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captured soldiers during armed conflict.9 These treaties were binding
only on the states that ratified them. In general, they gave individuals
no right to enforce rights or to seek compensation when injured by a
violation. Instead, enforcement was either non-existent or left to
states in their relationships with each other.
During the decades following the atrocities of World War II,
states dramatically expanded human rights commitments through a
web of human rights treaties.10 In addition, as acceptance of human
rights norms expanded, the prohibitions codified in many of these
treaties developed into customary international law or jus cogens
norms, binding on all states even without state consent. The
Nuremberg Tribunal marked the beginning of this process when it
recognized that the prohibition of crimes against humanity was
binding on all states because it was ―recognized by all civilized
nations‖ and ―regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs
of wars.‖11 The tribunal applied the prohibition as a rule of customary
international law, even though the underlying treaty only bound states
that were party to it.12
These universal human rights norms are ―extraterritorial‖ by
definition. That is, they apply everywhere, across borders. Genocide,
slavery, and torture are prohibited everywhere, without restrictions
imposed by geography or state lines.13 It is important to pause for a
9. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and
Wounded of Armies in the Field (1864), 22 Stat. 940 (1865).
10. For an overview of the development of international human rights norms after World
War II, see Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 22 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 53, 64–75 (1981).
11. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 254 (1947).
12. Id. at 253–54. The Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land of
1907 stated that ―[t]he provisions [of this Convention] do not apply except between
contracting Powers, and then only if all belligerents are parties to the Convention.‖
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 2296, 1 Bevans 631, 644.
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§-702 (1987) (―A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade . . . [or] (d) torture.‖); see
also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (stating that
―genocide . . . is a crime under international law,‖ with no qualifications or exceptions);
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 2(2), Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
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moment to consider the significance of this. When genocide or
slavery or torture occurs in Nigeria or Colombia or the United States,
a universal norm has been violated. International law prohibits this
conduct everywhere. Specific treaties may have geographical
limitations, but universal norms do not.
B.
The consequences of these universal prohibitions are more
contested. What do the universal prohibitions of genocide, slavery,
and torture signify in terms of implementation and enforcement?
Does international law bind all states to prohibit conduct that violates
universal norms as a matter of domestic law, hold perpetrators
accountable, or provide redress to victims? Or is implementation—
including prohibition, punishment, and redress—left to each state?
Several treaties obligate states to prohibit certain conduct as a
matter of domestic law, extradite or prosecute those accused of such
behavior, or deliver the accused to an international tribunal for
prosecution.14 Some treaties also obligate states to provide redress to
those harmed by human rights violations.15 Many scholars argue that
customary international law has adopted additional obligations to
redress violations of international law, binding on all states, not just
those that explicitly ratify these treaties. In 2005, the General
Assembly endorsed a general right to redress when it adopted a
broad-ranging set of principles on the right to a remedy and
reparation.16 The principles call on states to provide victims of human
rights violations with access to justice and effective remedies,
including reparation.17 The principles also call on states to prevent,
investigate, and punish human rights violations.18
[hereinafter Torture Convention] (―No exceptional circumstances whatsoever . . . may be
invoked as a justification of torture.‖).
14. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 13, art. 1 (stating that genocide ―is a
crime‖ which states ―undertake to prevent or punish‖); Torture Convention, supra note 13,
art. 5 (requiring that states prosecute or extradite torturers).
15. See, e.g., Torture Convention, supra note 13, art. 14 (―Each State Party shall ensure
in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable
right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible.‖).
16. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16,
2005).
17. Id. ¶¶ 11–23.
18. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3(b), 4.
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The ongoing struggle of the human rights movement and civil
society more generally is to incorporate affirmative obligations into
the international understanding of the human rights norms. It is not
enough to prohibit certain conduct on paper; there must also be an
obligation to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide redress.
II.
Corporations bear responsibility for human rights violations
around the world.19 Corporate agents commit such violations directly,
as when corporate security forces kill or injure people. Corporate
actors also conspire in and finance violations committed by
government officials. But victims of corporate human rights
violations are hard-pressed to find a venue with the legal authority to
hold a multinational corporation liable for its human rights violations.
Corporations use multiple legal structures to insulate themselves from
accountability. And multinational corporations have used their
considerable economic might around the world to create protections
for their own due process and substantive rights, while carefully
blocking efforts to develop similar protections for those injured by
their activities.
A.
The concepts of territoriality and extraterritoriality are
meaningless when applied to modern corporations. Multinationals
often choose the place of their incorporation—and, therefore, their
nationality—because of the financial and legal implications, not due
to their ties to their ―home‖ state. They set up subsidiaries, holding
companies, and other entities based on the same logic. The result is a
web of corporate structures explicitly designed to minimize
accountability and liability for the impact of their operations,
including accountability and liability for human rights violations.
Within this web, territorial and extraterritorial have little meaning.
Phillip Blumberg traced the origins of this liability-shifting
structure to the early-twentieth-century decision to allow corporations

19. For historical perspective on corporate human rights abuses, as well as modern
examples, see Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 45–47, 49–53 (2002).
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to own stock in other corporations.20 Corporate shareholders were
granted the same limited liability protection as individual
shareholders, despite the shared business that linked the parent and
subsidiary companies:21
[This structure] overlooked the fact that the parent
corporation and its subsidiaries were collectively
conducting a common enterprise, that the business had
been fragmented among the component companies of
the group, and that limited liability – a doctrine
designed to protect investors in an enterprise, not the
enterprise itself – would be extended to protect each
fragment of the business from liability for the
obligations of all the other fragments.22
A century later, the result is a legal structure that wrongly
attributes legal independence to each component company and
ignores the corporate group’s multiple, amorphous, and often
artificial legal identities.23 As such, it is misleading to term regulation
of the various pieces of the multinational corporation as
extraterritorial merely because the parent company is based
elsewhere. Determining the proper venue to sue a multinational
corporation is a classic shell game.
The facts underlying the Kiobel case decided by the Supreme
Court in April 2013 provide one example. Although personal
jurisdiction was not litigated in Kiobel,24 the facts are similar to those
in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,25 which was filed six years
earlier and settled in 2009. The Wiwa complaint was based in part on
20. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 56–59 (1993).
21. Id. at 58–59.
22. Id. at 59.
23. As Blumberg explained:
These very large corporations typically operate as multi-tiered multinational groups
of parent and subsidiary corporations collectively conducting worldwide
economically integrated enterprises that for legal or political purposes have been
fragmented among the constituent companies of the group.
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 283, 298 (1990).
24. In the Kiobel case, defendants failed to challenge personal jurisdiction in their
Rule 12 motion to dismiss, thereby waiving the challenge and, in effect, consenting to
personal jurisdiction. They also failed to file a forum non conveniens motion; it is not clear
whether the federal courts would consider such a motion timely if it were filed after the case
is remanded to the district court.
25. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
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actions of the global Shell/Royal Dutch Petroleum multinational
enterprise, and also on actions of its Nigerian subsidiary, Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (SPDC).26 Profits
from the Nigerian operation flow up the chain to the parent
corporation, although it would take a forensic accounting team to
unravel where those profits end up (and where taxes on those profits
should be paid).27 Although Shell Oil Company, the U.S. subsidiary,
does billions of dollars of business in the United States, those U.S.
ties were not attributed to Royal Dutch Petroleum, the parent
company, for the purposes of personal jurisdiction.28 Instead,
personal jurisdiction was based on a handful of direct ties between
Royal Dutch Petroleum and New York State.29 According to
corporate-friendly rules, Shell U.S.A. is a separate entity from the
others, and litigation against Royal Dutch Petroleum in the United
States for events that occurred in Nigeria is ―extraterritorial.‖ But that
conclusion merely reflects Royal Dutch Petroleum’s artificial (but
perfectly legal) business decisions, made precisely to insulate its
various divisions from the legal obligations incurred by other
divisions.
In another infamous example, after the Union Carbide disaster in
Bhopal, India, a 1984 chemical leak that killed thousands of people
and injured tens of thousands more, representatives of the victims of
the leak argued that the Union Carbide should be viewed as a single
legal entity, rather than as independent parts:
In reality there is but one entity, the monolithic
multinational, which is responsible for the design
development and dissemination of information and
technology worldwide, acting through a neatly
designed network of interlocking directors, common
operating systems, global distribution and marketing
systems, financial and other controls. . . . Persons
harmed by the acts of [a] multinational corporation are
[not] in a position to isolate which unit of the
enterprise caused the harm, yet it is evident that the
26. Id. at 92.
27. See id. (describing Shell/Royal Dutch Petroleum Company as a ―vertically integrated
network of affiliated but formally independent oil and gas companies‖).
28. See id. at 93.
29. Id. at 94–99. The court did not consider plaintiffs’ argument that Shell U.S.A. was
the alter ego of Royal Dutch Petroleum. Id. at 95 n.4.
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multinational enterprise that caused the harm is liable
for such harm. The defendant multinational
corporation has to bear this responsibility for it alone
had at all material times the means to know and guard
against hazards likely to be caused by the operation of
the said plant, designed and installed or caused to be
installed by it and to provide warnings of potential
hazards.30
U.S. courts rejected this approach, dismissing the case on the basis of
forum non conveniens after concluding that there was insufficient
connection between the U.S. parent company and the Indian
operation to justify suit in U.S. courts.31
On rare occasions, the shell game turns around and bites the
corporation (to mix a metaphor). In 1993, Ecuadorans sued Texaco
Oil in a U.S. federal court, seeking damages for environmental harms
in Ecuador.32 Texaco, a U.S. corporation, argued successfully that the
lawsuit should be litigated in Ecuador, and the U.S. claim was
dismissed in 2002 on the condition that Texaco submit to the
jurisdiction of the courts in Ecuador.33 In 2011, the Ecuadoran courts
issued a final, enforceable judgment against Chevron Corporation—
which had merged with Texaco in 2001—for nineteen billion dollars.
Texaco’s response to the Ecuadoran judgment has been nothing short
of scorched earth. The company has employed hundreds of lawyers
and dozens of law firms to file racketeering claims against all those
involved in Ecuador litigation, and it has used an international
arbitration procedure to block the government from enforcing the

30. Jamie Cassels, Outlaws: Multinational Corporations and Catastrophic Law, 31
CUMB. L. REV. 311, 324 (2000) (second alternation in original) (quoting Complaint ¶ 19,
Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp., (Sept. 5, 1986) (India)). To view a reprint of the full
complaint, see UPENDRA BAXI & AMITA DHANDA, VALIANT VICTIMS AND LETHAL
LITIGATION: THE BHOPAL CASE 3–12 (1990).
31. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 809
F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal).
32. For an overview of this litigation, see Suraj Patel, Delayed Justice: A Case Study of
Texaco and the Republic of Ecuador's Operations, Harms, and Possible Redress in the
Ecuadorian Amazon, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 71 (2012). For diametrically opposed views of the
underlying issues, compare the material posted at About the Campaign, CHEVRON TOXICO:
THE CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE IN ECUADOR, http://chevrontoxico.com/about/ (last visited
Apr. 3, 2013) with Ecuador Lawsuit, CHEVRON, http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/ (last
visited Apr. 3, 2013).
33. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002).
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judgment.34
The lesson to other multinational corporations may be to think
carefully before deciding that a forum in the host state will prove
favorable. But, as discussed in the following section, Chevron’s use
of international arbitration reflects a growing movement away from
the courts to a forum even more reliably tilted in favor of corporate
interests.
B.
Corporations appear to be increasingly wary of the dangers they
face in litigation in the courts of the states in which they do business.
As a result, they have sought to institutionalize the right to raise
claims against the governments of those host states through
arbitration. Regional trade agreements and thousands of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) permit corporations that invest in ―foreign‖
states to challenge state actions before arbitration panels and to
enforce any resulting damage award in local courts.35 The treaties
guarantee fair treatment, contract enforcement, protection against
expropriation, and compensation for violations of other rights. They
also provide access to a neutral arbitration proceeding and a
guarantee that any judgment will be enforceable.
These arbitration agreements are one-sided in the sense that they
provide protections for the foreign investor but do not impose any
reciprocal obligations on the investor. Corporations have opposed
efforts to codify corporate obligations through multilateral or bilateral
treaties. Moreover, victims of corporate misbehavior have no neutral
forum in which to vindicate their rights.

34. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 783 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Patel,
supra note 32, at 97–98 (describing Chevron’s attempt to quash the Ecuadorian ruling
through an international court of arbitration).
35. For an overview, see Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication,
61 DUKE L.J. 775, 831–41 (2012) (discussing bilateral and regional investment agreements
and international investment arbitration mechanisms). For discussions of the potential for
conflict between the protections that these agreements afford to corporations and the rights
of natural persons, see Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights
26–31 (Inst. Dev. & Peace Research Paper Series, Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human
rights.pdf, and LUKE ERIC PETERSON, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 27–31 (2009), available at http://publications.gc.ca/
collections/collection_2012/dd-rd/E84-36-2009-eng.pdf.
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C.
Multinational corporations have succeeded in imposing an
international legal system that is heavily weighted in their favor.
International law respects domestic law definitions of the corporate
structure, which permit international enterprises to incorporate as
multiple legally separate entities that, as a general rule, are not
considered to be responsible for each other’s debts and obligations,
including compensation for injuries they inflict. And international
law contains thousands of treaties granting corporations the right to
seek arbitration when their rights are allegedly violated in a country
in which they are considered to be a foreign corporation. Finally,
corporations have resisted efforts to codify their international law
obligations, or to create a neutral forum in which they would be
required to respond to claims that they have caused damage in the
places where they do business.
As a result, multinationals have a host of mechanisms to avoid
legal accountability. When sued in the place where they do business,
they claim that the harms were inflicted by a local subsidiary, not by
the parent company, and that the subsidiary has insufficient assets to
pay for the injuries. If forced to litigate in the host country, they
argue that the courts of that state are corrupt or biased against them or
otherwise incompetent to hear the claim.36 When corporations are
sued in their own home country or in the courts of a third country,
they argue that they are the wrong defendant and are not responsible
for the subsidiaries’ actions or that the courts of that state have no
right to hear claims occurring outside their territory. 37
Complaints about the extraterritorial application of the ATS
must be understood in this context. In the United States, the ATS has
filled a small part of the enforcement gap, permitting a small number
of those injured by corporate human rights abuses to file suits in U.S.
courts if they can assert personal jurisdiction over the corporate
defendant. Many of the cases have been filed against U.S.
corporations and are not, therefore, extraterritorial. All those filed
against foreign corporations involve companies with a presence in the
36. Cf. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2012) (describing
Chevron’s arguments that a judgment rendered against it by Ecuadorian courts should not be
enforceable on the basis that Ecuadoran judiciary was tainted by political interests).
37. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec.
1984, 809 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1987) (―UCC moved to dismiss the complaints on grounds
of forum non conveniens, the plaintiffs’ lack of standing to bring the actions in the United
States . . . .‖).
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United States sufficient both to establish personal jurisdiction and to
survive a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. In its April
2013 decision in Kiobel, however, the Supreme Court narrowed the
application of the ATS, as discussed in the following section.
III.
For over two decades, ATS jurisprudence assumed without
discussion that the statute applied to conduct outside the United
States. Most important, in its 2004 decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, the Supreme Court decided an ATS case involving events
that took place in Mexico.38 The Court rejected application of the
statute to the facts of that case,39 and much of the discussion and
reasoning of the opinion is based on the assumption that the statute
primarily concerns claims arising in the territory of foreign states.40
The Court also declined to even address the Executive Branch’s
arguments about extraterritoriality.41 In subsequent cases, a handful
of dissenting opinions discussed the issue,42 but the extraterritorial
application of the statute remained relatively noncontroversial until
the Supreme Court ordered the Kiobel litigants to brief and argue the
following issue: ―Whether and under what circumstances the [ATS]
allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law
of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.‖43

38. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
39. Id. at 738 (holding that a detention of less than a day, followed by transfer to lawful
custody, did not violate an international norm sufficient to support a federal common law
claim under the ATS).
40. The majority, for example, discussed the possibility of imposing a requirement of
exhaustion of domestic remedies, id. at 733 n.21, a procedure that would be unnecessary
unless the acts giving rise to the claim arose in the territory of a foreign state. The Court also
discussed at some length the potential foreign policy concerns triggered by ATS cases, a
concern that is not present in cases that do not involve foreign states. Id. at 727–28.
41. See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46–50, Sosa,
542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339) (arguing that federal courts cannot recognize ATS claims based
on conduct occurring in the territory of foreign states).
42. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 74–81 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
43. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.). The Supreme
Court originally granted review in Kiobel to consider whether the ATS applies at all to
corporate defendants, but, after oral argument on that issue, the Court ordered reargument on
the issue of extraterritoriality. Id. Although the opinion did not directly address the
corporate-defendant issue, the fact that the Court acknowledged the possibility that a claim
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In the April 2013 Kiobel decision, Chief Justice Roberts, writing
for a five-Justice majority, acknowledged that the standard statutory
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to the ATS,
because the presumption applies to statutes that regulate conduct
abroad.44 The ATS, by contrast, provides jurisdiction; federal
common law provides the cause of action, based on clearly defined,
widely accepted international law norms.45 The Kiobel majority
relied instead on the ―principles underlying the presumption of
extraterritoriality,‖46 because of ―the danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy.‖47
The Court then rejected the argument that the text, history, and
purposes of the ATS rebut this new presumption, a result with which
I strongly disagree. But the majority opinion concluded by
recognizing the possibility that an ATS case with sufficient ties to the
United States might ―displace‖ the presumption. In this section, I first
discuss my objections to the Court’s conclusion that the presumption
against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, then discuss the
relatively narrow holding of the case and consider what claims are
likely to be actionable after Kiobel.
A.
In Kiobel, the Court imposed a twenty-first-century standard of
interpretation—requiring a clear indication that Congress intended
the courts to recognize extraterritorial common law claims—on an
eighteenth-century statute, and ignored the common sense reading of
the text of the ATS, contemporary understanding of its reach, prior
judicial interpretations, and the congressional response to the
application of the statute to extraterritorial acts.
Statutory text: The text of the ATS grants federal courts
jurisdiction over claims for ―a tort only, committed in violation of the
might have sufficient ties to the United States to ―displace‖ the presumption against
extraterritoriality, see infra Part III.B, suggests that the ATS can apply to corporate
defendants. Moreover, the Second Circuit held that it did not have ATS subject matter
jurisdiction over a claim against a corporate defendant, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), an argument that the
Supreme Court presumably rejected since it did not dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
44. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
45. Id. (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713).
46. Id. at 1665.
47. Id. at 1664. The majority in effect creates a new presumption, the Kiobel
presumption, applicable to the common law cause of action created in ATS cases. See id. at
1664–65.
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law of nations . . . .‖48 This text includes no limits on the location of
the torts that trigger federal jurisdiction. Other provisions of the same
section of the First Judiciary Act did include territorial limitations,49
indicating that the Congress that enacted the ATS had thought about
such restrictions, knew how to include them, and chose not to so limit
the ATS.
The Court in Kiobel noted that the statute uses the term ―tort,‖
and that, at the time the statute was enacted (and today as well),
transitory torts could be litigated in U.S. courts no matter where the
claims arose.50 The Supreme Court relied on the common law
understanding of transitory torts in Burnham v. Superior Court of
California,51 quoting Justice Story’s observation that ―by the
common law[,] personal actions, being transitory, may be brought in
any place, where the party defendant may be found.‖52 The use of
―tort‖ in the ATS thus provides strong evidence that the eighteenthcentury Congress intended the statute to apply to transitory torts that
constituted violations of the law of nations.
Contemporary understanding: A 1795 opinion of Attorney
General William Bradford, issued just a few years after the ATS was
enacted, concluded that the ATS applied to a claim arising in the
territory of Sierra Leone, a sovereign state.53 Bradford noted that the
criminal prosecution of those involved in the violation of the law of
nations would not be possible, but then stated:
[T]here can be no doubt that the company or individuals who
have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73.
49. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat. 73, at 76–77 (granting the district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes ―committed within their respective districts, or upon the
high seas,‖ and over certain seizures made ―on waters which are navigable from the sea by
vessels of ten or more tons burthen‖ or ―within their respective districts as well as upon the
high seas‖).
50. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665–66.
51. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
52. Id. at 611 (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 554, 543
(1846)).
53. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795). For an extensive discussion of
the Bradford opinion, including contemporaneous documents confirming that Bradford knew
that the events had occurred in the territory of a foreign state, see Supplemental Brief of
Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History et al. in Support of Petitioners at 18–25, Kiobel,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
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a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction
being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an
alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or
a treaty of the United States . . . .54
The Court discredits this source as insufficient to counter the
presumption against extraterritoriality.55 But the Bradford opinion
shows that, just six years after Congress enacted the ATS, the leading
lawyer in the U.S. government thought that it applied to conduct
within the territory of a foreign state. Surely, this evidence is crucial
to the interpretation of a statute enacted over 200 years ago, and
stronger evidence of the intent of the first Congress than the strict
version of the presumption against extraterritoriality recently adopted
by a modern Supreme Court.
Modern judicial interpretation: The Supreme Court has
considered the meaning of the ATS in multiple cases, each involving
extraterritorial torts. None of those cases even hint that the location of
the underlying events might be relevant to the application of the
statute.56 In addition, in the 2004 decision in Sosa, the Court cited the
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala decision with approval.57 Since Filártiga
involved torture in Paraguay,58 it clearly relied on extraterritorial
application of the ATS. The Kiobel majority made no effort to
explain the apparent acceptance of extraterritorial application of the
ATS in the Court’s own decisions.

54. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 59.
55. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667–68.
56. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (holding that the defendant was not
entitled to statutory immunity, without questioning the application of the ATS to the facts, in
an ATS case involving human rights abuses in Somalia); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 732 (2004) (holding, in a case involving events in Mexico, that the claim did not state a
cause of action, without questioning whether the statute would apply to a properly stated
claim, and citing with approval cases applying the statute to events that took place in foreign
states); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 436 (1989)
(discussing the ATS and assuming that it would have applied if not for the immunity granted
to the defendant, a sovereign state, in a case involving an attack on a tanker on the high
seas); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964) (citing the ATS
as one of several constitutional and statutory provisions ―reflecting a concern for uniformity
in this country's dealings with foreign nations and indicating a desire to give matters of
international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions,‖ in a case involving
expropriation in Cuba).
57. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (noting that Sosa’s holding was ―generally consistent with the
reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this Court,‖
and citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980), as one example of this
consistency).
58. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878.

12-Stephens

270

8/28/2013 9:27 PM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:256

Congressional response: The Second Circuit decided Filártiga
in 1980, over three decades ago. Since that time, Congress has
expressed support for the Filártiga interpretation of the statute,59 and
has made no effort to narrow the reach of the ATS by excluding
jurisdiction over acts occurring within the territory of foreign states.
To the contrary, Congress expanded human rights claims in three
separate statutes: the Torture Victim Protection Act,60 the AntiTerrorism Act,61 and the ―state sponsors of terrorism‖ exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.62 Each statute further extends
the right to bring civil claims for human rights violations; each
applies to acts occurring in the territory of foreign states; and none
purports to replace or narrow the scope of the ATS. As the Supreme
Court emphasized in Sosa, ―Congress . . . has not only expressed no
disagreement with our view of the proper exercise of the judicial
power, but has responded . . . by enacting legislation supplementing
the judicial determination in some detail.‖63
Finally, to the extent that litigation in U.S. courts of human
rights claims arising out of events in foreign states triggers concerns
about fairness to the defendants, foreign policy, or inconvenience,
those problems are properly addressed through one or more standard
federal court doctrines: personal jurisdiction, political question or act
of state, and forum non conveniens.64 Human rights claims are not
more complex or politically sensitive than dozens of other cases
routinely decided by federal courts. When ATS cases have
insufficient ties to the United States, trespass upon the foreign affairs
powers of the Executive Branch, or require that a court judge the
59. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3–4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86
(stating that the ATS has ―important uses and should not be replaced,‖ and noting that the
Filártiga decision has ―met with general approval‖).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (authorizing U.S. citizens, as well as noncitizens, to
sue for torture and extrajudicial execution).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006) (authorizing a U.S. national ―injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism‖ to sue for treble
damages).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. V 2011) (permitting suits for extrajudicial killing, torture,
and other abuses against states labeled ―sponsor[s] of terrorism‖ by the U.S. Department of
State).
63. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note).
64. For a full discussion of the application of these doctrines to extraterritorial ATS
claims, see Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts as Amici Curiae on
Reargument in Support of Petitioners at 1–30, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).

12-Stephens

8/28/2013 9:27 PM

2013] EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER KIOBEL

271

legitimate acts of a sovereign state, the courts have applied these preexisting doctrines and have dismissed the claims. There is nothing
unique about ATS claims that requires application of novel, contorted
rules of statutory interpretation.
B.
The Kiobel decision was clear on a few important points, while
leaving many others unresolved. Most clearly, the Court unanimously
rejected application of the ATS to the claims at issue in that case:
foreign plaintiffs, suing a foreign corporation with a minimal
presence in the United States, for events that took place entirely
outside the United States.65 The five-Justice majority reached that
result after concluding that the principles underlying the presumption
against extraterritoriality ―constrain courts exercising their power
under the ATS.‖66 The majority emphasized that application of the
ATS to events arising in the territory of foreign states posed ―the
danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign
policy.‖67
The opinion also left clear, however, that, in some
circumstances, a claim might have sufficient ties with the United
States to ―displace‖ the Kiobel presumption.68 The concluding
language narrowly limited the holding to the facts of this case:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place
outside the United States. And even where the claims
touch and concern the territory of the United States,
they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.
Corporations are often present in many countries, and
it would reach too far to say that mere corporate
presence suffices. If Congress were to determine
otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would
be required.69
Thus, where claims ―touch and concern the territory of the United
States . . . with sufficient force,‖ they will ―displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application,‖ even if they arise outside of the
65. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
66. Id. at 1665.
67. Id. at 1664.
68. Id. at 1669.
69. Id. (citation omitted).
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United States.70
Concurring opinions on behalf of three of the Justices in the
majority emphasized that the majority opinion did not address all
claims arising outside the United States. Justice Kennedy noted that
―[t]he opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of
significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the
Alien Tort Statute,‖ and observed that, in his view, ―that is a proper
disposition.‖71 He concluded that in cases ―with allegations of serious
violations of international law principles‖ that are not covered by the
―reasoning and holding‖ of Kiobel, ―the proper implementation of the
presumption against extraterritorial application may require some
further elaboration and explanation.‖72
Justices Alito and Thomas would have preferred that the
majority opinion went further. They argued that ―a putative ATS
cause of action will fall within the scope of the presumption against
extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the domestic
conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies
Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized
nations.‖73 But their view that only human-rights-violating conduct
within U.S. territory is sufficient to support an ATS claim obtained
only two votes from the Court, and they acknowledged that the
Court’s conclusion takes a ―narrow approach‖ that ―leaves much
unanswered.‖74
These two concurring opinions, joined by three members of the
70. Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883–88 (2010)).
71. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. Id. If Kiobel had definitively barred all claims arising outside of the United States,
there would be no need for ―further elaboration and explanation‖ of the ―proper
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application‖ of the ATS.
73. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1669–70. Justice Breyer’s separate concurring opinion for four Justices also
recognizes that the majority opinion ―offers only limited help in deciding‖ what cases fall
within the reach of the ATS. Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
The majority echoes in this jurisdictional context Sosa’s warning to use
―caution‖ in shaping federal common-law causes of action. But it also makes
clear that a statutory claim might sometimes ―touch and concern the territory
of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption.‖ It
leaves for another day the determination of just when the presumption
against extraterritoriality might be ―overcome.‖
Id. (citations omitted). Seven of the Justices thus stated explicitly that the majority
opinion leaves many issues undecided.
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five-Justice majority, clarify that Kiobel did not address claims that
have a greater connection to U.S. territory than those at issue in the
Kiobel case.
C.
What categories of post-Kiobel claims will have sufficient ties to
the United States to ―displace‖ the presumption against
extraterritoriality? The final paragraph of the majority opinion
offered some clues. First, the majority concluded that the ATS would
not support claims against a defendant with a ―mere corporate
presence‖ in the United States, given that a corporation can be
―present in many countries.‖75 The corporate defendants in Kiobel
were Dutch, British, and Nigerian citizens, with minimal ties to the
United States.76 By contrast, a U.S. citizen corporation has a
substantial presence in the United States and connections to this
country that are qualitatively different from ―mere corporate
presence.‖ Second, Kiobel does not preclude claims against
individual defendants, who can, of course, be physically present in
only one country. As a result, it seems likely that U.S. citizens, both
corporate and individual, and non-citizen individuals living in the
United States will have sufficient contacts with the United States to
overcome the Kiobel presumption. Finally, the language of the
concluding paragraph suggests that some claims involving conduct in
the United States will ―touch and concern‖ the United States with
sufficient force to justify judicial recognition of a cause of action.
The policy reasons underlying the Court’s adoption of the Kiobel
presumption also support the view that claims against U.S. citizens,
both corporate and individual, and against individuals living in the
United States will continue to be actionable under the ATS. The
majority rested much of its analysis of the ATS on concerns about the
foreign policy consequences of such litigation.77 Holding U.S.
citizens accountable for violations of international law, no matter
where committed, would not have a negative impact on foreign
affairs. Similarly, denying safe haven to non-citizens who have
relocated to the United States is consistent with U.S. foreign policy
interests. As the Department of Justice wrote in an amicus curiae
brief in Kiobel, recognizing a cause of action against an alleged
perpetrator who is living in the United States ―is consistent with the
75. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 1662.
77. See, e.g., id. at 1664, 1669.
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foreign relations interests of the United States, including the
promotion of respect for human rights.‖78
The Supreme Court’s narrow holding left room to debate these
issues, and commentators and litigators analyzing Kiobel already
disagree about many aspects of the decision. Most agree on one
point, however: the scope of the ATS will now be fought (again) in
every pending case, and, in the likely event that the lower courts do
not reach a consensus, will probably reach the Supreme Court (yet
again).
*****
ATS human rights litigation represents a modest opportunity for
a small number of victims and survivors of gross human rights abuses
to seek a modicum of justice. The corporate campaign against such
litigation should be recognized as yet another effort by multinational
corporations to resist efforts to level the playing field of international
justice. The Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Kiobel should not
bar claims against U.S. corporations or claims against foreign
corporations with substantial ties to the United States.

78. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 13, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).

